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Legal Malpractice and Discovery of
Opinion Work Product in California:
The Dilemma Created by Absolute
Protection
American jurisprudence has recognized and respected many legal
privileges.' The privilege most vigorously asserted and jealously guarded
by the legal community is the protection accorded an attorney's work
product.' In California, an attorney's work product is protected under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 2016(b).3 Section 2016(b)
creates both a qualified privilege from discovery of ordinary work
product and an absolute privilege for opinion work product.' Ordinary
work product is only discoverable upon a judicial determination that
denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery,
or will result in an injustice.' Section 2016(b) provides that opinion
work product is not discoverable under any circumstances.6 As a
1. CAL. EVID. CODE §§930 (criminal defendant's privilege not to testify), 940 (privilege
against self-incrimination), 950 (attorney-client privilege), 970 (privilege not to testify against
spouse), 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), 990 (physician-patient privilege),
1010 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1030 (clergyman-penitent privlege), 1035.4 (sex assault
counselor-victim privilege); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §2016(b) (attorney work product privilege).
2. Wolfson, Opinion Work Product-Solving the Dilemma of Compelled Disclosure, 64
NEB. L. REV. 248-49 (1985). Work product consists of the tangible and intangible material
that reflects an attorney's efforts at investigating and preparing a case, including the results
of the attorney's own work, work of those employed for the client, the information thus
assembled, and the legal theories and strategies developed by the attorney. McCoy, California
Civil Discovery: Work Product of Attorneys, 18 STAN. L. REV. 783, 797 (1966).
3. California Code of Civil Procedure section 2016(b) states in pertinent part:
The work product of an attorney shall not be discoverable unless the court deter-
mines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in
preparing his claim or defense or will result in an injustice, and any writing that
reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories
shall not be discoverable under any circumstances.
CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE §2016(b).
4. Id.; Comment, Discovery and the Work Product Doctrine, 11 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 863,
871 (1980). An attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal research or theories
are commonly referred to as opinion work product. Material of a derivative or interpretive
nature obtained or produced in preparation for trial is commonly referred to as ordinary work
product. Comment, The Potential for Discovery of Opinion Work Product under Rule 26(b)(3),
64 IowA L. REV. 103 (1978).
Such material includes, but is not limited to: diagrams or charts; audit reports; or findings,
opinions or reports of experts. JEFFERsON, CA.romRA EVIDENCE BENCHEOOK, §41.1 (2d ed. 1982).
5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(b).
6. Id.
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privilege providing absolute immunity from discovery, the protection
accorded opinion work product in California conflicts with the policy
of liberal discovery.7
Expansion of pretrial discovery has been fundamental to the reform
of the American adversarial system. Broad discovery rules in Califor-
nia serve two important objectives.' The first objective is to expedite
litigation through disclosure of evidence.'" The second objective is
to encourage settlement of disputes." While pretrial discovery is in-
tended to take the game element out of trial preparation, discovery
is not intended to offend the general adversarial nature of litigation.' 2
The protection accorded an attorney's work product is an effort to
balance the need for liberal discovery while preserving the adversary
system.' 3 The tension between protection of an attorney's trial prepara-
tion and broad discovery philosophy in California has created confu-
sion and misconception regarding the scope and function of the work
product doctrine."' This confusion is heightened when an attorney's
7. Comment, Status of the Work Product Doctrine in California, 6 Sw. L.J. 677, 700
(1974) (the conflict is intensified because the source of discovery and privilege is not stable,
because interpretation of the statutes and cases vary from court to court).
8. Comment, Discovery of Attorney's Work Product, 12 GoNz. L. REv. 284 (1977).
American civil litigation utilizes an adversary rather than inquisitional system. Under the in-
quisitional system, the judge acts as prosecutor attempting to derive the truth through ques-
tioning. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (5th ed. 1979) The adversary system, however, utilizes
an impartial judge to preside over the trial. In order to determine the facts, biased presenta-
tions are prepared independently by rival parties. The adversarial system has certain short-
comings: (1) relevant facts remain hidden until trial; (2) the element of surprise plays a major
part in the outcome of the trial; and (3) the biased presentations sometimes lead to confusion
rather than help in the search for justice. Comment, Discovery of Attorney's Work Product,
12 GONZ. L. REv. 284 (1977).
9. WRIGHT, CALIFORNIA CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE, §1.2 (1975).
10. Id. The discovery process expedites litigation by narrowing issues, uncovering facts,
preserving evidence, and committing a party or witness to a particular version of the facts.
Id. at §1.3.
11. Id. The discovery process encourages settlement by exposing the strengths and weaknesses
of each party's case, thus providing the parties with information necessary to evaluate the merits
of the case. Id. at §1.4.
12. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 377, 364 P.2d 266, 275, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 99 (1961). Permitting broad discovery and thus making evidence available to both
parties improves the administration of justice by reducing unfairness inherent in a system in
which the quality of the representation available to a party can affect the outcome of a case.
Comment, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 412, 414
(1983). Broad discovery, however, is a tool to be used with the advocate's other efficient weapons
such as testimony in open court, cross-examination, impeachment, forensic skill, and mastery
of legal principles. Greyhound, 56 Cal. 2d at 377, 364 P.2d at 276, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100.
"13. Comment, supra note 8, at 284. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947).
The work product doctrine recognizes that an attorney needs a certain degree of privacy in
order to properly prepare a client's case and that needless interference by opposing counsel
will thwart that effort. Id. at 510-11.
14. Wolfson, supra note 2, at 249. The work product doctrine is discussed in language
that often results in misleading rather than instructing those who seek to apply the doctrine. Id.
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former client alleges attorney negligence or misconduct. In this situa-
tion, the work product sought to be discovered by the former client
may be directly at issue in the subsequent malpractice action.' 5
Only recently has legal malpractice developed as a substantive area
of law.1 6 Thus, the procedural rules governing the litigation of legal
malpractice claims are still in their incipiency. 7 The nature of the
fiduciary relationship between the attorney and client imposes eviden-
tiary problems for the client suing a former attorney.' 8 Much, if not
all, evidence of neglect or misconduct may be hidden in the attorney's
working papers.' 9 Consequently, discovery of an attorney's work pro-
duct to be used against that attorney may become a powerful eviden-
tiary tool.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the dilemma created
by according absolute protection to an attorney's opinion work pro-
duct in legal malpractice actions; and to suggest a proposal to resolve
the dilemma. To further this purpose, this comment will briefly re-
count the history of the work product doctrine in California from
the origin of the doctrine in the federal system.2" An initial deter-
mination regarding who holds the privilege in California is necessary,2'
followed by a discussion concerning the absoluteness of the privilege."2
This comment will then weigh the policy factors regarding discovery
of opinion work product in the legal malpractice setting.23 Finally,
a proposal will be offered for limited discovery of otherwise immune
work product.
EVOLUTION OF Tim WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE IN CALIFORNIA
A. Origin of the Doctrine: Hickman v. Taylor
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court announced the work pro-
15. See e.g., Travelers Ins. Companies v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 436, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 871 (1983). In Travelers, plaintiff alleged that her attorney, provided by her insurer,
failed to bring a medical malpractice action within the statute of limitations. Id. at 440, 191
Cal. Rptr. at 873. Plaintiff also alleged that the attorney fraudulently represented that the case
was delayed rather than barred. Id. Plaintiff sought attorney's opinion work product in order
to show fraud. The appellate court denied discovery on attorney-client privilege grounds. Id.
at 452, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
16. Mallen, Legal Malpractice: The Legacy of the 1970's, 16 FORUM 119, 130 (1980).
17. Id. at 119.
18. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart and Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188, 491
P.2d 421, 428 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1971), see infra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 83-142 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 143-198 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 199-244 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 245-254 and accompanying text.
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duct doctrine in the seminal case of Hickman v. Taylor.2 s In Hickman,
a party sought discovery of informal witness interviews taken by
opposing counsel.26 The trial court determined that the material was
not protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege and
granted a discovery order. 2" Counsel appealed after the trial court
found the attorney guilty of contempt for failing to obey the discovery
order. 2 The court of appeals reversed the contempt order and in-
troduced the work product concept. 29 The Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.3"
The Court first held that the attorney-client privilege had little, if
any, role in the delineation of restrictions on discovery of trial prepara-
tion materials. 3' At the same time, however, the Court recognized
a delicate balance between the right to discover relevant non-privileged
subject matter and protection of the adversary system.32 The Court
stated that an attorney, in order to properly prepare a client's case,
needs a certain degree of privacy to assemble information and plan
strategy.33 The Court, however, recognized that necessity, undue hard-
ship, or prejudice must outweigh the policy against invasion of an
attorney's work product in order to protect the liberal goals of
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3" Thus, the Court
created a qualified privilege protecting work product from discovery."
25. 329 U.S. 495, (1947). See McCoy, California Civil Discovery: Work Product of
Attorneys, 18 STAN. L. REV. 783, 784 (1966); Comment, supra note 8, at 285; Comment, supra
note 7, at 678; Wolfson, supra note 2, at 251 (historical reviews of the Hickman decision).
26. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498, 499.
27. Id. at 499.
28. Id. at 500.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 514.
31. Id. at 508. Prior to the Hickman decision, any discovery protection accorded an
attorney's work product was covered by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 498-99, 508. Although
the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege often times overlap in coverage,
the privileges serve different policy objectives. Wolfson, supra note 2, at 253. The attorney-
client privilege is predicated upon a policy of encouraging full and complete disclosure by a
client. Id. The work product doctrine is predicated upon a policy of preventing indiscriminate
discovery of an adversary's trial preparation materials. Id. The work product doctrine evolved
from the attorney-client privilege because of the inadequate protection accorded by the limited
scope of the attorney-client privilege. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
32. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
33. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. The Court stated:
1lt is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from un-
necessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a
client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan strategy without
undue and needless interference.
Id.
34. Id. at 512. "Were production of written statements and documents to be precluded
under [all] circumstances, the liberal ideals of the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would be stripped of much of their meaning." Id. at 511, 512.
35. Id. at 511.
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The holding in Hickman placed a burden upon the party seeking
discovery to justify invading an attorney's privacy in preparation for
litigation. 36 Following the Hickman decision, the California State Bar
became concerned about the potential impact upon existing Califor-
nia law."
B. The Response to Hickman in California
Prior to Hickman, the general perception in California was that
the attorney-client privilege protected an attorney's working papers
from discovery. 8 In response to the declaration by the United States
Supreme Court in Hickman that the attorney-client privilege does not
protect work product from discovery, the California State Bar Com-
mittee on Administration of Justice proposed an Amendment to the
Code of Civil Procedure. 9 The Amendment provided that an attorney's
working papers made in preparation of trial could not be examined
without the consent of the client.40 The Committee, however, aban-
doned efforts for legislative enactment of the proposed amendment
after the California Supreme Court decided the case of Holm v.
Superior Court.'
In Holm, the California Supreme Court held that the attorney-client
privilege prevented a party from discovering accident reports and
photographs of the scene prepared primarily for transmission to
counsel. 2 As a result, many California judges, legislators, and at-
torneys believed that work product was still protected under the
attorney-client privilege. 3 The protection accorded work product by
the attorney-client privilege in California was absolute rather than sub-
ject to special restrictions, like the federal privilege.44 Not surprising-
ly, when the California State legislature proposed adoption of the
Civil Discovery Act of 1957," S attorneys became concerned about the
impact the Act would have on the privileged status enjoyed under
existing California law regarding work product."
36. Id. at 512.
37. HOGAN, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY 3d, §12.01 (1981).
38. Comment, California Discovery Since Greyhound: Good Cause For Reflection, 10 UCLA
L. REV. 593, 595 (1963).
39. McCoy, California Civil Discovery: Work Product of Attorneys, 18 STAN. L. REV.
783, 787-88 (1966).
40. Id.
41. 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954).
42. Id. at 510, 267 P.2d at 1030.
43. Hogan, supra note 37, at 365.
44. Id.
45. 1957 Cal. Stat. c. 1904, at 3321.
46. Hogan, supra note 37, at 365.
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C. Civil Discovery Act of 1957
The proposed Civil Discovery Act of 1957 was modeled closely upon
the Federal Rules.47 Federal Rule 26(b)(3) expressly adopted the
Hickman work product doctrine.48 The State Bar Committee on
Administration of Justice, not content with work product protection
accorded by the federal rules, recommended that a specific provision
regarding privilege be included in the Act.49 The requested provision
was drafted in order to preclude the whittling away of work product
protection under the attorney-client privilege as defined in Holm. °
Acting on the request of the State Bar, the legislature incorporated
the last two sentences of section 2016(b) as enacted that year, which
stated that the Civil Discovery Act did not change the law regarding
privileges in California, nor incorporate any judicial decisions on
privilege of any other jurisdiction."' Unfortunately, the language of
the statute created an all or nothing protection of work product
exclusively hinged upon the continued existence and expansion of pro-
tection under the Holm rationale. 2 The absolute protection from
discovery of work product the legal community enjoyed under Holm
was disrupted when the California Supreme Court in Greyhound Corp.
v. Superior Court53 questioned the scope of the attorney-client privilege
announced in Holm." Shortly after Greyhound, the California Supreme
Court expressly overruled the Holm decision."
D. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court
Greyhound involved an action for damages resulting from a bus-
47. 1957 Cal. Stat. c. 1904, at 3321. In 1957, California adopted, with certain variations,
rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Masterson, Discovery of Attorney's
Work Product Under Section 2031 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 10 UCLA L.
REv. 575 n.1 (1963).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note.
49. Masterson, supra note 47, at 580 (1968).
50. Id. See supra note 41-44 and accompanying text.
51. 1957 Cal. Stat. c. 1904, at 3321.
All matters which are privileged against disclosure upon the trial under the law of
this state are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure. This article
shall not be construed to change the law of this State with regard to any privilege,
whether provided for by statute or judicial decision, nor shall it be construed to
incorporate by reference any judicial decisions on privilege of any other jurisdiction.
Id.
52. See Masterson, supra note 47, at 581. The legislative history is indicative of an intent
not only that attorney-client privilege as construed in Holm was to be preserved intact, but
that California judges were to build a work product concept framed on the Holm case. Id.
53. 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961).
54. Id. at 398-99, 364 P.2d at 289-90, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 113-14.
55. Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 176, 373 P.2d 432, 437, 23 Cal. Rptr.
368, 373 (1962).
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auto collision on an interstate highway.5 6 On the day of the accident,
agents of Greyhound obtained accident reports from a number of
witnesses and later delivered them to the attorney for Greyhound in
anticipation of litigation." Plaintiffs requested discovery of the
reports. 8 The trial court ordered defendant to produce the reports.19
After declining to extend the Holm rationale, the California Supreme
Court declared that the work product privilege did not exist in Califor-
nia.60 The court construed the language inserted into section 2016(b)
as a prohibition against judicial adoption of the federally created
privilege in Hickman.6 1 Although the court would not adopt a work
product privilege, a work product "concept" was recognized.62 Since
the witness reports sought to be discovered were not protected by
the attorney-client privilege, the reports were open to discovery. 63 The
court decided, however, that the sanctions which protect against abuse
of discovery gave courts full discretion to limit or deny discovery when
disclosure would be against public policy. 6 Since Greyhound failed
to show sufficient reasons to deny disclosure, discovery was ordered.65
The court replaced the privacy argument of the Hickman work pro-
duct doctrine with an unfairness approach premised on public policy
factors and judicial discretion.66 In addition, unlike the approach of
the federal system, the burden of showing a need to protect the at-
torney's work product was placed on the attorney making the asser-
tion. 67 Prior to Greyhound and its progeny, California attorneys en-
joyed greater discovery protection than the federal system provided
under Hickman. After Greyhound, California attorneys found
themselves with less work product protection than Hickman provided.
68
56. 56 Cal. 2d 355, 368, 364 P.2d at 270, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
57. Id., 364 P.2d at 271, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 401, 364 P.2d at 291, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
61. Id.
62. Hogan, supra note 37, at 367.
63. Greyhound, 56 Cal. 2d at 401, 364 P.2d at 291, Cal. Rptr. at 115.
64. Id. The court stated:
This is not to say that discovery may not be denied, in proper cases, when disclosure
of the attorney's efforts, opinions, conclusions, or theories would be against public
policy, or would be eminently unfair or unjust, or would impose an undue burden.
The California Legislature has designed safeguards for such situations. The sanctions
which protect against the abuse of discovery give the trial court full discretion to
limit or deny when the facts indicate that one litigant is attempting to take advantage
of the other.
Id.
65. Id. at 401-02, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16, 364 P. 2d 291-92.
66. Comment, note 38, at 609.
67. Comment, supra note 7, at 681.
68. See Hogan, supra note 37, at 366.
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To rectify the loss of work product protection resulting from
Greyhound and subsequent cases, the State Bar proposed an Amend-
ment to section 2016 in 1963.69
E. The 1963 Amendments to Section 2016
After Greyhound, the State Bar Committee on Administration of
Justice proposed Amendments to section 2016(b) in order to fulfill
the general intent of the legislature in enacting the Civil Discovery
Act of 1957.70 The proposals were intended to protect the lawyer's
normal work processes and establish a more desirable balance bet-
ween discovery and the right of litigants to obtain advice of experts,
make investigations and other acts, without fear of unlimited and in-
discriminate disclosures to adversaries." The California State legislature
responded to the proposal of the Committee by repealing the provi-
sion of section 2016(b) which had precluded the adoption of the
Hickman doctrine in Greyhound.71 The legislature also amended sec-
tion 2016(b) to add explicit work product protection. 7 Finally, the
legislature added section 2016(h) which set forth the legislative policy
of preserving an attorney's right to privacy in the preparation of cases
and preventing counsel from taking undue advantage of an opposing
attorney's industry or efforts.74 The policy statement in section 2016(h)
adopts both the "privacy" rationale If Hickman and the "unfairness"
rationale of Greyhound.71 Another major change made by the 1963
Amendment was to place the burden of persuasion on the party seeking
69. Selected 1963 Legislation, 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 681 (1963).
70. Committee Report Administration of Justice, 37 Cal. St. B.J. 586 (1962).
71. Id. The Board of Governors recommended that the State Bar:
(S]ponsor and strongly urge enactment of amendments to the Discovery Act in the
field of "work product." Such amendments, in the opinion of the Committee, are
needed, first, to fulfill the general intent of the Legislature at the time of enactment
in 1957, second, to protect the lawyer's normal work processes, third, in other rela-
tionships, to establish a more desirable balance etween "discovery" and the right
of litigants and prospective litigants to obtain advice of experts, make investigations
and do other acts, without fear of unlimited or indiscriminate disclosures to, and
use by adversaries.
Id. '1
72. 1963 Cal. Stat. c. 1744, at 3477-78.
73. Id. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
74. Id. "[T]he policy of this State is (i) to preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare
cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare cases thoroughly
and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of such cases, and (ii)
to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(h).
75. Comment, supra note 38, at 609; see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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discovery to show that denial of discovery would unfairly prejudice
the party or result in an injustice. 6
The work product privilege created by the 1963 Amendments to sec-
tion 2016 remains in force today. Although comprehensive, section
2016(b) leaves two important areas undefined. First, the section does
not define work product." Second, the section does not state whether
the client or the attorney is the holder of the privilege."' California
courts have had little difficulty defining work product."9 Resolving
the issue of who holds the privilege, however, has created confusion.
WHO HOLDS THE WORK PRODUCT PRVLEGE?
Determining the holder of the work product privilege is essential
to the resolution of the problem created when a former client attempts
to discover the work product of a former attorney." If the client
holds the work product privilege, an attorney cannot assert the privilege
against the client.8 California courts have not conclusively resolved
this issue. The weight of authority, however, tends to support the
conclusion that the attorney is the exclusive holder of the work pro-
duct privilege.82
Several California appellate courts have addressed the issue regard-
ing who holds the work product privilege.83 The cases, however, have
created a split of authority on this issue. 84 Generally, the holdings
fall into three broad catagories. In the first category, the courts hold
that the attorney is the exclusive holder of the privilege.15 The courts
in the second category hold that the client and the attorney hold the
76. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(b).
77. Id. §2016(b). Section 2016(b) sets forth the definition of absolutely protected work
product as impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Mack v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d 7, 10, 66 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1968).
80. Lasky, Haas, Cohler, & Munter v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 264, 270, 218
Cal. Rptr. 205, 208 (1985).
81. See Fellows v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 55, 64-5, 166 Cal. Rptr. 274, 280
(1980). The holder of the privilege also maintains the right to waive the privilege; therefore,
if the client holds the privilege, the client can simply waive the privilege on his or her own
behalf and demand discovery.
82. Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
83. See Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 218 Ca. Rptr. at 213; Lohman v. Superior Court,
81 Cal. App. 3d 90, 101, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171, 178 (1978); Fellows, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 65,
166 Cal. Rptr. at 280; Mack, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 10, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 282; Kallen, 157 Cal.
App. 3d at 951, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 885; Academy of California Optometrists, Inc., 51 Cal.
App. 3d at 1006, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
84. Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
85. See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
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privilege. 6 Finally, the courts in the third category hold that the client
owns the work product of an attorney. 7
A. California Appellate Court Interpretations
1. The Attorney as Holder of the Work Product Privilege
The first resolution of the issue, squarely in the favor of the at-
torney, was reached in Lohman v. Superior Court." The defendants
sought discovery of the opinion work product of the plaintiff's former
counsel.8 9 The plaintiff's former counsel disclosed during a deposi-
tion some legal opinions formed while representing the plaintiff.9 0
Plaintiff argued that the evidence taken during the deposition should
be protected because the work product privilege was intended for the
benefit of both the client and the attorney. 9' The court in Lohman,
however, stated that unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work pro-
duct privilege was created for the purpose of protecting the attorney. 92
The court declared that the attorney holds the privilege and, thus the
attorney alone can claim or waive the privilege. 93 The most recent
case deciding who holds the work product privilege, Lasky, Haas,
Cohler & Munter v. Superior Court,9" also held in favor of the
attorney.
Lasky is factually similar to Lohman.95 The plaintiffs were attorneys
who represented the trust beneficiaries of J. Paul Getty's estate
generally and Gordon Getty specifically. 96 The beneficiaries, as secon-
dary clients, sought discovery of the attorney's opinion work product
to facilitate their claim against Gordon Getty for mismanagement of
the trust.97 Plaintiffs refused to produce writings and discussions,
86. See infra notes 105-120 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
88. 81 Cal. App. 3d 90, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1978).
89. Id. at 93, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
90. Id. at 99, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
91. Id. at 101, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
92. Id., 146 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
93. Id.
94. 172 Cal. App. 3d 264, 218 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1985).
95. Compare Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 264, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 205, with Lohman, 81
Cal. App. 3d at 90, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (in both cases the defendant attorney owed a fiduciary
duty to the party seeking discovery).
96. Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 268, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 206. Gordon Getty is the sole
remaining trustee of the trust established by J. Paul Getty and Sarah C. Getty. Id.
97. Id. at 269, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 207. The plaintiffs contended that since the trustee owes
a fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries, legal services obtained by the trustee are primarily
for their benefit and thus are secondary or joint clients of the trustee's attorney. Id. at 282,
218 Cal. Rptr. at 216. The appellate court, however, decided that the beneficiaries were not
secondary clients in this case. Id. at 285-86, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 218-19.
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asserting the work product privilege.98 The trial court determined that
a client has the right to require his or her attorney to disclose un-
communicated work product.99 In addition, the trial court decided
that the fiduciary relationship between trustee and trust beneficiaries
permits adversarial beneficiaries to compel discovery of the opinion
work product of the trustee's attorney.' The appellate court in Lasky
acknowledged that strong policy considerations favor a client's ab-
solute right of access to all work product generated by attorneys."'
The appellate court, however, reversed the decision of the trial court
holding that the attorney is the exclusive holder of the work product
privilege. 02 2 The court concluded that denial of discovery fully sup-
ported the policy justifications for the work product privilege as stated
in section 2016(h).103 The Lasky court, however, adopted a narrow
holding and avoided the issue as applied to a client seeking a former
attorney's work product in order to prepare a case against that
attorney.'0 4 The Lohman and Lasky decisions are not conclusive on
this issue. Several courts have determined that the privilege is for the
benefit of both the client and the attorney.
2. The Client and Attorney as Joint Holders of the Work
Product Privilege
In Fellows v. Superior Court, the defendant insurance carrier in
a bad faith action sought discovery of the work product of the plain-
tiffs' former attorney. 05 The attorney had represented plaintiffs in
their initial dispute with the insurer. 06 Plaintiffs, who were in posses-
sion of the work product, asserted the work product privilege on behalf
of the absent attorney. 07 The Fellows court agreed that the attorney
was the holder of the privilege. 08 The court, however, held that the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Both the trustee and the trust beneficiaries benefited from the trust. The trust
beneficiaries were adverse to the trustee in regard to management of the trust. Id.
101. Id. at 279, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
102. Id. at 278, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
103. Id. "[Tihe policy of this State is (i) to preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare
cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare cases thoroughly
and to investighte not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of such cases, and (ii)
to prevent an attorney from taking advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts." CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(h).
104. Id. at 279, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
105. 108 Cal. App. 3d 55, 59, 166 Cal. Rptr. 274, 277 (1980).
106. Id., 166 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
107. Id. at 60, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
108. Id. at 65, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
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client may assert the privilege on behalf of the former attorney." 9
The court believed this interpretation to be in accord with the rules
governing the various privileges set forth in the Evidence Code."10
Under these evidentiary privileges, a fiduciary may assert the privilege
on behalf of the client."'
The Fellows rationale is faulty in two respects. First, unlike the
evidentiary privileges, no parallel statutory provision is provided in
the work product privilege. Thus, the lack of statutory language sup-
ports the inference that only the holder of the privilege may assert
the privilege."II Second, the ability to assert the evidentiary privileges
on behalf of the client flows naturally from the duty the fiduciary
owes the client." 3 The client has no reciprocal fiduciary duty to pro-
tect the attorney. Thus, the policy of protecting an attorney's privacy
interest is endangered when a client, who is unskilled in the law, waives
the work product privilege.I" The Fellows court appears to have settled
on middle ground between the Lohman and Lasky decisions and the
holding in Mack v. Superior Court.'II
In Mack, the plaintiffs sought discovery of the work product of
the defendant's former attorney." 6 Plaintiffs attempted to discover
information concerning a real estate appraisal obtained and held by
the former attorney." 7 Defendants asserted the work product privilege
on behalf of the former attorney to prevent discovery of the ap-
praisal." 8 The court, without elaborating, held that the work pro-
duct privilege was created for the protection of the client as well as
the attorney."19 The finding in Mack, however, has been criticized
by subsequent courts.' 0 Cases which have examined the issue outside
109. Id.
110. Id. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§950 (attorney-client privilege), 990 (physician-patient
privilege), 1010 (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
111. CAL. EVID. CODE §§954, 994, 1014.
112. SAN s, 2A SurHERsmD STATUTORY CONSTRUCTMON §51.02 (4th ed. 1984). When a statute,
with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from
a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention
existed. Id.
113. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILiTY EC 4-4 (1981). A lawyer owes an obliga-
tion to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely to assert the privilege unless
it is waived by the client. Id.
114. Comment, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
412, 433, (1983). The privacy the attorney needs is the privacy to prepare without interference
from opponents and without fear that the material might be used against the interests represented.
Id.
115. 259 Cal. App. 2d 7, 66 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1968).
116. Id. at 9, 66 Cal. Rptr. 281.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 10, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
120. Lohman v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (the court
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of the discovery context have held that the client owns the work pro-
duct of an attorney.
3. The Client as Owner of the Work Product of an Attorney
The courts holding that the client owns the work product of an
attorney address the issue in terms of the ethical duties of a discharged
or withdrawing attorney.' 2 ' Under Rule 211(a)(2) of the California
Rules of Professional Conduct, a discharged attorney must deliver
to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled.' 22
In Kallen v. Delug, an attorney refused to execute a substitution of
attorney agreement or transmit the client's files until an arrangement
was made regarding fees.' 23 The court held that retaining a client's
case file after discharge or withdrawal is a breach of an attorney's
ethical duty.'24
An attorney's work product belongs to the client whether or not
the attorney has been paid for services rendered. 2 ' In Academy of
California Optometrists, Inc. v. Superior Court, an attorney placed
a lien on a client's case file for payment of fees.' 26 The file included
pleadings, points and authorities, interrogatories, depositions, exten-
sive notes, papers, memos and communications. 27 The court held the
lien invalid under Rule 211(a)(2). 28
The holdings in Kallen and Academy of California Optometrists
have questionable precedential value for determining who holds the
work product privilege, for several reasons. First, the courts did not
stated that the reasoning in Mack was faulty because the thrust of the work product doctrine
is to provide a privilege for the attorney, protecting the fruits of labor from discovery. The
legislature could have given the client work product protection by simply stating so in §2016).
But see Fellows, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 64-5, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (the Fellows court criticized
the Lohman decision for misreading the holding of Mack; Mack only held that in the attorney's
absence, the client may assert the privilege on the attorney's behalf).
121. See Kallen, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 885; Academy of California
Optometrists, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 672; Weiss, 51 Cal. App. 3d
at 599, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
122. CAL. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT Rule 211(a)(2) states:
In any event, a member of the State Bar shall not withdraw from employment until
he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client,
including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and
complying with applicable laws and rules.
Accord, Opinions of the Committee on Legal Ethics of the L.A. County Bar Assn. Opn. No.
330 (1972).
123. 157 Cal. App. 3d 940, 945, 203 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881 (1984).
124. Id. at 951, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
125. Id.
126. 51 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1001, 124 Cal. Rptr. 668, 669 (1975).
127. Id. at 1004, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
128. Id. at 1006, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
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discuss the issue of who holds the privilege in the discovery context. 2 9
Second, the courts made reference to work product not as a client
privilege but rather as client property. 3 ' Finally, the extent to which
the client is entitled to papers and property was not determined."'
Examination of appellate court decisions in California does not con-
clusively resolve the issue regarding who holds the work product
privilege. Lasky, the most recent case on point, concluded that the
attorney is the exclusive holder of the work product privilege. 3 2 The
outcome in Lasky also seems to be supported by the apparent legislative
intent of section 2016.
B. Legislative Intent
Unlike other statutory privileges,' 33 section 2016 is silent on the issue
of who is the holder of the privilege.'34 The legislative intent of the
work product doctrine in section 2016, however, may be derived by
comparing the proposed version of the Amendment with the version
actually enacted by the legislature.' 3 The proposal of the State Bar
Committee stated: [I]t is the policy of this state (i) to preserve
the rights of parties and their attorneys to prepare cases... and (ii)
to so limit discovery that one party or his attorney may not take
undue advantage... "(emphasis added).' 36 At the request of Judicial
Council, ' the term parties was amended out of the proposal to in-
sure that protection was accorded to attorneys.' 38 The enacted ver-
sion of the policy statement reflects the request of Judicial Coun-
129. Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
130. Id. at 277, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
131. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. The file described in Academy represents
an attorney's opinion work product. The word "entitled", however, contemplates some papers
or property to which the client is not entitled.
132. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
133. CAL. EVsD. CODE §§950 (attorney-client privilege), 990 (physician-patient privilege), 1010
(psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.4 (sex assault counselor-victim privilege).
134. Id. §§953 (the client holds the attorney-client privilege), 993 (the patient holds the
physiciart-patient privilege), 1013 (the patient holds the psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1035.6
(the victim holds the sex-assault counselor-victim privilege).
135. Southland Mechanical Constructors Corp. v. Nixen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 417, 427, 173
Cal. Rptr. 917, 921 (1981). Legislative records may be looked at to determine legislative intent. Id.
136. Comment, supra note 38, at 609.
137. The Judicial Council consists of the Chief Justice and one other judge of the Supreme
Court, three judges of the courts of appeal, five judges of the superior courts, three judges
of the municipal courts, and two justices of justice courts, each appointed by the Chief Justice
for a two-year term; 4 members of the State Bar appointed by the governing body for a 2-year
terms; and one member of each house of the legislature appointed as provided by the house.
CAL. CONST. Art. 6, §6.
138. See letter from Judicial Counsel to Senator Cobey, April 24, 1963, on file at Pacific
Law Journal.
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cil. 39 The absence of a specific declaration stating that the client holds
the privilege, together with the enacted version of the Committee's
proposal suggests that the attorney is the exclusive holder of the work
product privilege.
In light of the Lasky and Lohman decisions and the legislative
intent behind the 1963 Amendments to section 2016, the work pro-
duct privilege appears to be held exclusively by the attorney. Since
the client does not hold the work product privilege, the client cannot
obtain discovery of a former attorney's work product without con-
sent of the attorney.'40 Clearly, however, under section 2016(b), a
client can obtain ordinary work product by making the requisite show-
ing of prejudice or injustice. 4 ' Discovery of opinion work product
is not permitted, even by a former client, if the absolute protection
accorded by section 2016(b) truly is absolute.' 42
Is OPINION WORK PRODUCT ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED?
Section 2016(b) purports to create an absolute privilege against
discovery of opinion work product.'43 California appellate courts have
interpreted the protection accorded opinion work product as being
absolute.' 44 Moreover, the statutory language and legislative intent of
the work product doctrine under section 2016(b) supports the conclu-
sion that opinion work product is absolutely protected.' 45
A. California Appellate Court Interpetations
California appellate courts have unanimously interpreted the pro-
tection accorded opinion work product as absolute.'46 Two courts,
139. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §2016(h).
140. Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 279, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 214.'
141. Id. §2016(b). The party seeking discovery must show that denial of discovery will result
in unfair prejudice or injustice. Id.
142. Id. Discovery of an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research
or theories shall not be discoverable under any circumstances. Id.
143. Id.
144. See infra notes 146-171 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 172-186 and accompanying text.
146. Rodriguez v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 648, 151 Cal. Rptr.
399, 410 (1978); Schlumberger Limited v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 3d 386, 394, 171
Cal. Rptr. 413, 418 (1981); Watt Industries Inc. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 3d 802,
805, 171 Cal. Rptr. 503, 504 (1981); Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App.
3d 467, 478, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471, 478 (1984); Mack v. Superior, 859 Cal. App. 2d 7, 9, 66
Cal. Rptr. 280, 282 (1968); City of Long Beach v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. App. 3d 65, 80,
134 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1976); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 579, 594, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 573 (1974); Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v.
Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 3d 496, 500, 165 Cal. Rptr. 748, 751 (1980); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 436, 453, 191 Cal. Rptr. 871, 882 (1983). Rumac
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however, have expressed reservations about an attorney asserting ab-
solute protection against a former client. In Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley,
the court held that an attorney's opinion work product is protected
absolutely.'"7 Craig and Rumac were opposing parties in litigation. 4 '
Craig served his former attorney, Bottomley, with a subpoena duces
tecum.'4 9 Bottomley moved for a protective order asserting that the
documents were protected as opinion work product.5 0 Both Craig
and Rumac opposed the motion.' 5 ' The trial court granted the motion
with respect to some of the documents.' s2 Rumac appealed.'" The
appellate court noted that since Craig, the attorney's former client,
was not a party to the appeal, the court would not address the at-
torney's liability for asserting the privilege against the client's wishes.'4
Asserting the absolute privilege against a former client would be
statutorily correct. 5 5 The court suggested, however, that an attorney
asserting the privilege against a former client's wishes may be liable
for damages proximately caused by the assertion of the privilege., 6
In Lasky, Haas, Cohler & Munter v. Superior Court, the court
stated that strong public policy considerations exist for concluding
that a client has a right of access to all work product generated by
an attorney representing the client's interests.'5 7 The court, however,
stated that the language of section 2016(b) compelled the conclusion
that the protection of opinion work product is absolute. 1 8 The court
narrowed the holding by acknowledging that far stronger public policy
considerations are involved in discovery when the client seeks a former
attorney's work product to prepare a case against that attorney. 5 9
Other appellate courts have not expressed the same concern as the
court in Lasky.
v. Bottomley, 143 Cal. App. 3d 810, 815, 192 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1983); Fellows v. Superior
Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 55, 67, 166 Cal. Rptr. 274, 281 (1980); Lohman v. Superior Court,
81 Cal. App. 3d 90, 101 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171, 178 n.5 (1978); Lasky, Haas, Cohler &
Munter v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 264, 271, 218 Cal. Rptr. 205, 208 (1985).
147. 143 Cal. App. 3d 810, 815, 192 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1983).
148. Id. at 813, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 105.





154. Id. at 812 n.3, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 105 n.3.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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While no California case exists which is directly on point,16 ° dicta
in several cases suggest that a client may not compel discovery of
a former attorney's opinion work product. In Popelka, Allard,
McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court, attorneys from a law firm being
sued for malicious prosecution were deposed concerning the prior
case.' " Defendants asserted the absolute work product privilege under
section 2016(b). 62 The trial court entered an order compelling a
member of the firm to answer the deposition questions.' 63 The appellate
court, reversing the trial court, stated that filing a malicious prosecu-
tion action or, by the same logic a malpractice action, should not
automatically open an attorney's file to a prior action., 6 The court
stated further that an attorney, anticipating a future suit for malpractice
or malicious prosecution, would hesitate to commit doubts about a
case to paper.' 6 The concern expressed by the court regarding possi-
ble hesitation about recording thoughts was one of the primary reasons
behind the work product doctrine enunciated in Hickman.' 66 The
precedential value of the Popelka opinion as to discovery by a former
client is limited. The party seeking discovery in Popelka was an alleged
victim of malicious prosecution, rather than a former client. 67
In Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Superior Court, petitioner sought
discovery of the opinion work product of the insurer's former at-
torney.' 68 The petitioner claimed that the privilege against discovery
was not absolute when a party establishes a compelling need.' 69 As
an example, the petitioner claimed that discovery should not be denied
when the attorney's work product is the only evidence on an issue. "
The court agreed that ordinary work product is potentially discoverable,
but held that opinion work product is absolutely protected."' The
potential discovery of opinion work product when the work product
is the issue, however, was not addressed in Aetna."' Courts inter-
160. Travelers Ins. Companies v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 436, 453, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 882 (1983).
161. 107 Cal. App. 3d 496, 498, 165 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750 (1980).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 499, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
164. Id. at 501, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
165. Id.
166. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
167. The plaintiff was suing the defendant law firm for malicious prosecution for a previous
action in which plaintiff was an adverse party to the client of the law firm. Id. at 498, 165
Cal. Rptr. at 750.
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preting the privilege accorded opinion work product have determined
that the privilege is absolute. The language and legislative intent of
the work product doctrine in California generally supports the con-
clusions of the courts.
B. Legislative Intent
According to section 2016(b), the opinion work product of an at-
torney "shall not be discoverable under any circumstances."'" The
language providing for absolute protection of an attorney's opinion
work product is clear and explicit.'74 When the language of a statute
is clear on its face, legislative intent as an aid to interpretation is
unnecessary."' Moreover, since the language of section 2016(b) offers
no opportunity for compromise or variation, courts are not authoriz-
ed to weigh or balance any competing interests between the party seek-
ing discovery and the party resisting disclosure.' 76 Following these
general principles of statutory interpretation, courts will inevitably hold
that the protection accorded opinion work product is absolute. 77
Although establishing legislative intent is not necessary to deter-
mine whether the protection accorded opinion work product is ab-
solute, legislative intent does support absolute protection. The language
creating an absolute protection against discovery of opinion work pro-
duct was drafted into the initial proposal submitted by the California
State Bar. '7 The proposal by the State Bar was modeled closely upon
the proposal drafted by the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, in 1946. 79 The federal proposal, however, was
173. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §2016(b).
174. Fellows v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 55, 68, 166 Cal. Rptr. 274, 282 (1980).
175. Southland Mechanical Contractor Corp. v. Nixen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 417, 427, 173
Cal. Rptr. 917, 923-24 (1981).
176. Fellows, 108 Cal. App. at 68, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
177. See, Hogan, supra note 37, at 443 (the language of §2016(b) is so explicit that arguing
that the immunity conferred on opinion work product is anything other than absolute is difficult).
178. Committee Report Administration of Justice, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 586 (1962). The pro-
posal stated in pertinent part: "any writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories shall not be discoverable under any circumstances." Id.
179. Comment, supra note 38, at 609. The proposal by the Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure stated:
The court shall not order the production of inspection of any writing obtained or
prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipa-
tion of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial or production
or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection
in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him undue hardship or injustice. The
court shall not order the production or inspection of any part of the writing that
reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories,
or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert.
Id. at 610.
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never adopted by the United States Supreme Court.8 0 The Court chose
to announce the work product doctrine in Hickman.'"' The Hickman
decision does not provide for absolute protection of opinion work
product.' 2 The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of the mean-
ing ascribed to words or phrases construed in earlier judicial deci-
sions.' 8 1 Since the 1963 Amendments to section 2016 contain express
language regarding absolute protection of opinion work product not
present in the Hickman decision, the legislature is presumed to have
intended to establish an absolute protection for an attorney's opinion
work product.'84
The language and legislative intent behind the work product doc-
trine as interpreted by California courts support the conclusion that
an attorney's opinion work product is absolutely protected.' 85 The
decisional law has not created any clear-cut exceptions to the
privilege.' Any temperance of the absolute protection must come
from legislative enactment or judicial development of the waiver
principle. 87
C. Waiver As A Method For Discovery of Opinion Work
Product
Since the attorney holds the work product privilege, only the at-
torney can waive the privilege. 8 No statutory provision exists,
however, for waiver of the attorney's work product privilege.'8 9 Thus,
development of waiver principles has come from decisional law.' 90
The appellate court in Kerns Construction Co. v. Superior Court
opened the door to discovery of opinion work product by holding
that an attorney may not assert the work product privilege after
effectively waiving the privilege. '9' The attorney in Kerns revealed work
product to a witness in order to refresh the witness' memory during
180. Id. at 609.
181. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
183. Southland, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 430, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
184. But see Comment, supra note 38, at 611. Prior to enactment of the 1963 Amendments
to §2016, one commentator suggested that the intention to treat opinion work product specially
was to merely restore the status of witness statements taken by attorneys to the pre-Greyhound
era. Id.
185. See supra notes 174-184 and accompanying text.
186. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EvMENcE BENCH BOOK, §41.2 (2d ed. 1982).
187. Id.
188. Lohman, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
.189. JEFFERSON, supra note 186, at §41.2.
190. Id.
191. 266 Cal. App. 2d 405, 411, 72 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77 (1968).
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a deposition. 9 Opposing counsel sought discovery of the reports on
the waiver theory. 93 The court, permitted discovery and stated that
waiver of the privilege serves the principle of the work product doc-
trine.'94 In order to waive the work product privilege, an attorney
must do more than tender the content of the work product in the
litigation.' 95 Waiver only occurs when an attorney increases the
opportunity of an adversary to obtain the information.' 96 Thus, waiver
provides only a limited method for discovery of opinion work product.
Opinion work product is absolutely immune from discovery.
Moreover, waiver principles do not readily permit access to opinion
work product by a client. 97 Strong policy considerations exist, however,
when a client seeks a former attorney's work product.'98 The com-
peting policies regarding discovery of opinion work product must be
evaluated to determine whether discovery should be compelled and
in what circumstances discovery would be appropriate.
COMPETING POLICIES REGARDING DISCOVERY OF
OPINION WORK PRODUCT
A. Evidentiary Interest
The absolute protection accorded an attorney's opinion work pro-
duct has created a dilemma for the client seeking discovery of a former
attorney's work product in a legal malpractice action. Most legal
malpractice claims are brought under tort theory.' 99 Therefore, to
recover damages the plaintiff must show a fiduciary relationship giving
rise to a duty, a breach of that duty, and that the breach proximate-
ly caused the plaintiff's injury."'0 The fiduciary relationship, however,
creates evidentiary problems for the plaintiff.2"' First, the client may
be unable to recognize the negligence of the attorney. The attorney-
192. Id. at 408, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
193. Id. at 409, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
194. Id. at 410, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
195. See Schlumbarger Limited v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 3d 386, 393, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 413, 417 (1981); see also Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court, 107
Cal. App. 3d 496, 502, 165 Cal. Rptr. 748, 752 (1980) (in both cases the content of the work
product was tendered into issue by suing the attorney for malpractice or malicious prosecution).
196. Wolfson, supra note 2, at 269. As a result, attorneys must be cautious about per-
mitting clients or third parties to see their opinion work product. Hogan, supra note 37, at 445.
197. See supra notes 143-196 and accompanying text.
198. Lasky, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 277, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
199. Meiselman, Attorney Malpractice: Law and Procedure, §2:5 (1980).
200. Id. at §3:1.
201. Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188, 491 P.2d
421, 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1971).
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client relationship is generally an association of a professional and
a layperson.2"2 The obligation of an attorney is to use the skill,
prudence, and diligence commonly exercised by practitioners in the
profession. 20 3 A corollary to the professional's skill is the layperson's
inability to recognize negligence of the professional. 24 Discovery of
the attorney's working papers, including those containing opinion work
product, may help the client recognize negligence. Access to a former
attorney's work product gives the client the opportunity to scrutinize
the work performed at each stage of the representation with the aid
of another attorney. 25 Thus, issues regarding the attorney's conduct
may be efficiently narrowed to specific acts, rather than examining
the representation as a whole. Narrowing of issues before trial is a
recognized goal of the discovery process.20 6
Second, not only may the client fail to recognize negligence, but
often the client will lack the opportunity to view evidence of neglect.20 7
Much of an attorney's work must be performed out of the client's
view. 208 For example, a plaintiff suing for legal malpractice claiming
that the attorney failed to research adequately20 9 might find that all
the evidence is in the hands of the plaintiff's former lawyer and pro-
tected as opinion work product.210 If discovery is not permitted, the
client may not have a viable cause of action.2 ' Discovery is intended
to assist in the administration of justice.21 2 Discovery should not be
used to create injustice.
Uncovering facts and narrowing issues for trial are recognized goals
of the discovery process.21 3 Thus, an important evidentiary interest
is preserved by permitting discovery of an attorney's opinion work
202. Id.
203. Id. One who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade
is required to excercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profes-
sion or trade. Restatement (Second) of Torts §299A (1965).
204. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 188, 491 P.2d at 428. 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
205. Id.
206. Wright, supra note 9, at §1.3.
207. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 188, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844, 491 P. 2d at 428.
208. Id.
209. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (plaintiff
alleged that attorney did not research adequately).
210. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 188, 491 P.2d at 428. 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
211. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor has been found inapplicable in a legal malpractice
action. See Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 810 n.3, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 n.3
(1975); see also, 7 C.J.S. 494 Attorney & Client §270 (1973). Res ipsa loquitor aids a plaintiff
who is unable to sustain the requisite burden of proof due to the circumstances resulting in
the injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §328D (1965).
212. Comment, supra note 114, at 414.
213. Wright, supra note 9, at §1.3.
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product by a former client preparing a malpractice case against that
attorney. While strong evidentiary reasons exist to compel limited
disclosure of an attorney's opinion work product, ethical obligations
should also be considered.
B. Ethical Interests
An attorney asserting the privilege against a former client is no
longer protecting the client's interests."' The work product doctrine
protects the interests of the attorney as an attorney.2" Thus, individual
interests of the attorney are beyond the scope of the doctrine. 2 6
As a fiduciary, an attorney embraces an obligation to render full
and fair disclosure to the client of all the facts that affect the client's
rights and interests. 21 7 Disclosure must be complete, and any material
concealment or misrepresentation amounts to fraud.218 Thus, an
attorney asserting the work product privilege against a former client
may have already breached the fiduciary obligation to disclose.21 9 Com-
pelling discovery of an attorney's opinion work product by a former
client prevents the attorney from benefiting from a previous ethical
violation by denying the client a cause of action.220 In addition, the
California Rules of Professional Conduct state that an attorney may
not attempt to exonerate him or herself from, or limit, in any way,
personal liability for malpractice. 21 Denying a former client evidence
to prepare a case against an attorney by claiming work product pro-
tection is clearly an attempt to limit or prevent personal liability. Con-
doning a violation of an attorney's ethical duties is contrary to the
public policy of California.222 Absolute protection of an attorney's
opinion work product from disclosure to a former client preparing
a case against that attorney condones the breach of an attorney's ethical
duties. Respecting attorneys' ethical obligations is an important policy
consideration favoring limited disclosure of opinion work product.
Ethical interests, however, must be balanced against an attorney's pro-
prietary interest in work product.
214. The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the
law, solely for the benefit of his client and free from compromising influences and loyalties.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-1 (1981).
215. CAL. Cwv. PROC. CODE §2016(h).
216. Comment, supra note 114, at 431.
217. Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
218. Id. at 189, 491 P.2d at 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 6-102 (1979).
222. Kallen 157 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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C. Proprietary Interests
The work product doctrine protects an attorney's proprietary in-
terest in work expended on a case. 3 The attorney has an economic
interest in work product, therefore, subjecting the work to discovery
by an opponent would be inequitable.224 In California, however, an
attorney's proprietary interest is secondary to the interests of the
client.225 Work product is prepared on behalf of a client and the client's
proprietary interest is superior to the attorney's, even if the client
has not paid for the work. 26 Thus, discovery of an attorney's opin-
ion work product should not be denied to a former client in order
to further an attorney's proprietary interest.227 Although protecting
an attorney's proprietary interest is not highly regarded in Califor-
nia, protection of the adversary system is a recognized interest favor-
ing absolute protection of opinion work product.
D. Adversarial Interests
The work product privilege is a delicate balance between the com-
peting interests of liberal discovery and protection of the adversary
system. 26 The doctrine prevents an incompetent or lethargic practi-
tioner from taking advantage of an adversary's efforts.229 By concen-
trating on each party's unique interests in a lawsuit, opposing attorneys
raise all relevant facts and possible interpretations of those facts at
trial. 230 Opinion work product merits special protection because after
all the facts of a case are exposed, the only aspect that keeps the
trial adversarial is the independent strategy and thoughts of each at-
torney.231 Protecting the attorney as an advocate protects the adver-
sary system.232 Thus, the scope of the work product doctrine should
be limited to the protection necessary to preserve the attorney's role
223. Comment, supra note 114, at 429.
224. Comment, supra note 8, at 292.
225. See Kallen, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 885;, Academy of California
Optometrists, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 3d at 1006, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 672; Weiss, 51 Cal. App. 3d
at 599, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 304. See supra notes 121-132 and accompanying text.
226. See id.; see also Opinions of the Committee on Legal Ethics of the L.A. County Bar
Assn. Opn. No. 330 (1972).
227. Comment, The Potential For Discovery of Opinion Work Product under Rule 26(b)(3),
64 IovA L. REv. 103, 115 (1978).
228. Comment, supra note 8, at 284. See also, Hickman, 329 U.S. at 497.
229. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 401, 364 P.2d 266, 291 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 115, (1961).
230. Comment, supra note 114, at 428.
231. Id. at 428-29.
232. Id. at 432.
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as an advocate. 2"3 The attorney in an individual capacity does not
need protection. 234 Thus, if denying discovery of work product serves
the attorney's individual interest, rather than the attorney's interest
as an advocate, the protection is overinclusive. An attorney is protec-
ting individual interests when asserting the privilege against a former
client preparing a case against that attorney. Consequently, the adver-
sary system is not protected by an attorney asserting absolute protec-
tion of opinion work product against a former client. Moreover, an
attorney's interest in trial preparation is not harmed by limited
disclosure of opinion work product.
E. Trial Preparation Interests
The work product privilege is intended to influence an attorney's
behavior as a client representative.3 In California, the policy of the
privilege is to preserve the degree of privacy necessary to encourage
attorneys to prepare cases thoroughly.36 Furthermore, attorneys should
investigate the favorable and unfavorable aspects of each case. 2"
In Hickman, the Court stated that open discovery of work product
would discourage lawyers from producing written material. 2"1 As a
result, lawyers would become overly dependent on memory. 23 9 The
legal profession, interests of clients, and the cause of justice would
be poorly served. 210
File organization and maintenance is crucial in preventing many
of the errors that result in malpractice claims. 2'1 Arguably, potential
discovery of opinion work product by a former client may lead at-
torneys to disregard the importance of file maintenance.242 Thus, com-
pelling discovery may increase the likelihood of malpractice. One of
ihe principal purposes of the work product doctrine is to promote
233. Id.
234. Id. at 434.
235. Id. at 431-32.
236. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(h).
237. Id.
238. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
239. Id.
240. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavaroz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (1974).
If opinion work product is freely discoverable, lawyers will become overly dependent
on memory, with the result the "truth, instead of being more readily ascertainable,
will become lost in the murky recesses of the memory in the minds of men, who
after all, are human and subject to the human fraility of rationalization."
Id.
241. SMITH, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE, at 10 (1981).
242. Popelka, 107 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
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file maintenance and trial preparation." 3 The need for adequate
preparation, however, can be promoted by means other than the
privilege against discovery of opinion work product. Self-protection
is a strong incentive affecting the attitude and manner in which at-
torneys approach their responsibilities.24 ' Since trial preparation is pro-
tected by an attorney's self-interest, as well as by the work product
doctrine, limited discovery of opinion work product will not jeopar-
dize society's interest in thorough trial preparation.
Many competing interests exist regarding the discovery of an at-
torney's opinion work product by a former client preparing a case
against that attorney. Perhaps the most compelling interest is that
absolute protection may sustain breaches of an attorney's ethical duties
to a client. Undeniably, however, protecting the adversary system and
an attorney's ability to prepare a case thoroughly are important
objectives. A compromise discovery procedure serving the interests
of the client and the legal profession would be beneficial to each.
Injured clients would have the means to obtain evidence necessary
to bring a cause of action. The legal profession would avoid the
appearance of impropriety caused by asserting a privilege against a
former client.
PROPOSAL
The California legislature expressly enacted an exception to the
attorney-client privilege when the subject matter of the confidential
communication is sought in an action arising from a breach of duty
between client and attorney.24 5 A similar exception to the absolute
protection of opinion work product should be enacted if the legislature
determines that the policy justifications for compelling discovery
outweigh the benefits of absolute protection. When an attorney's opin-
ion work product is at issue, the need for discovery is great and an
exception to the special protection accorded opinion should be
available.24 6 The policies militating against discovery, however, must
not be ignored. Opinion work product should remain absolutely
privileged unless the party seeking discovery shows that: (1) the sub-
ject of the work product is at issue, (2) evidence of the negligence
or misconduct is unavailable through any other source, (3) denial of
243. Id.
244. Mallen, supra note 16, at 130.
245. CAL. EvID. CODE §958. There is no privilege under this article as to a communication
relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the
lawyer-client relationship. Id.
246. Comment, supra note 227, -at 118.
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discovery vill leave the party with no other reasonable recourse, and
(4) ethical breaches of duty are likely to occur.
Each requirement of this proposal is an attempt to limit the
application of the exception to very unique circumstances. Requiring
that the content of the work product be at issue ensures that discovery
of opinion work product may only take place when attorney negligence
or misconduct is an issue. Discovery of opinion work product should
be allowed only in rare circumstances.2"7 When an attorney's opinion
work product in not an issue in the litigation the need for discovery
is less than the putative interests to deny discovery.24"
Requiring the plaintiff to show that evidence of neglect or miscon-
duct is not available through any other source ensures that the plain-
tiff has exhausted all the possible sources for evidence. One of the
policy objectives behind the work product doctrine is to promote
thorough investigation of cases.2"9 This proposal is not meant to be
used to enhance an injured party's case. The proposal only provides
the injured party with a viable cause of action. The plaintiff, however,
still must present the case and sustain the burden of proof.2"'
Requiring a showing that the party has no other reasonable recourse
recognizes that injustice must be the result if discovery is denied.
Discovery principles were developed to improve the administration of
justice.2 5' Injustice results when an injured party is uncompensated
for an injury. The work product privilege should not be used to create
an injustice.
Finally, requiring a showing of a breach of an ethical duty in order
to allow discovery recognizes that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty
to a client. State law must not condone breaches of an attorney's
ethical duty.25 2 When an attorney fully discloses relevant information
affecting the client's rights and interests, discovery of the attorney's
opinion work product in unnecessary. When an attorney does not
disclose information to the client and further asserts the work pro-
duct privilege against that client respect for the legal community is
247. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977). Under Federal Rule 26(b)(3), opin-
ion work product is not absolutely protected. Opinion work product, however, is accorded
substantially higher protection than ordinary work product. Id. The court in Murphy stated
that a crime or fraud exception might justify discovery of opinion work product. Id. at 337.
The party seeking discovery of opinion work product under the crime or fraud exception must
show (I) counsel was aware of crime or fraud, and (2) the documents sought bear a close
relationship to the crime or fraud. Id. The party seeking discovery in Murphy, however, did
not make the requisite showing and discovery was denied. Id.
248. See generally, Comment, supra note 227, at 118.
249. Wright, supra note 9, at §1.3.
250. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE, §3:1 (1980).
251. Comment, supra note 114, at 414.
252. Kallen, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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in jeopardy. Integrity in the legal profession is fostered by the fiduciary
relationship, and therefore the relationship must not be compromised. 2"
CONCLUSION
The absolute protection accorded an attorney's impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal research and theories under section 2016(b)
has the potential of creating a gross injustice to a client seeking
discovery of a former attorney's work product. While the cases are
inconclusive, if taken together with the legislative intent of section
2016(b), the attorney is the exclusive holder of the work product
privilege in California. The protection accorded opinion work pro-
duct under section 2016(b) is absolute. Strong public policy considera-
tions suggest that in certain situations, the overall policy of liberal
discovery and fair judicial determination of legal controversies require
discovery of otherwise immune opinion work product. The Califor-
nia State legislature should incorp6rate a limited exception to the ab-
solute protection accorded an attorney's opinion work product. 254 A
standard for discovery of opinion work product has been proposed
that protects the interests of the client and the legal profession. This
proposal is intended to create a very narrow exception to the absolute
protection accorded an attorney's opinion work product. This pro-
posal not only considers the fundamental concerns that underly the
work product doctrine and the goals of the litigation process, but
also considers the realities of modern discovery. The standard does
not provide absolute certainty at the expense of practical considera-
tions that pervade each case. The ultimate focus of any discovery
standard must be fundamental fairness.
Thomas W. Hiltachk
253. Comment, supra note 114, at 427.
254. At the time of this writing, the California State Legislature has introduced AB 169,
which would amend much of the discovery provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. The
proposed provisions regarding work product retain the absolute protection accorded an attorney's
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories provided by existing law. The
January 8, 1986 version of AB 169 restates the policy provision as follows:
It is the policy of the state to assure to each party to an action, and to each party's
attorney, insurer, consultant, surety, indemnitor, and agent, that degree of privacy
for the product of their work in anticipation of litigation for trial that will (1) pro-
vide an incentive for thorough preparation of their case for trial (2) promote the
investigation of not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of their case, and
(3) prevent one party from taking unfair advantage of another party's industry and
efforts.
This author does not believe that the proposed amendments to existing law regarding work
product will assist discovery of opinion work product by a former client. Since the Discovery
Act is being rewritten, however, the time is ripe for legislative enactment of the proposal offered
by this comment.
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